FOREIGN-POLICY STRATEGY IN POST-SOVIET STATES: A PROBLEM OF CHOICE
(en) Dr. Sergey Birukov I
The question of foreign-policy strategy choice in post-Soviet countries is a problem of today. In Kyrgyz political expert Alexander Knyazev’s fair opinion some CIS countries seek to follow a multiple-vector strategy which transforms in an unprincipled bidding. The example of a great number of states approves this conclusion.
NATO's central objective is reinforcing of its positions in the post-Soviet territories, propaganda of "American and European values," introduction of ideas of Western civilization superiority, necessity and inevitability of main CIS countries integration in the Euro-Atlantic Community".
Many foreign Non-Governmental Non Profit Organizations increase progressively their ideological and informational impact on youth, politically active population groups, leaders of oppositional political and social structures of CIS countries.
Recent OSCE summit in Astana became a symbol of closer relations between East and West. Not all controversial points were successfully settled but step-by-step the transformation process of the organization not into an institute yet but into “an important platform for dialogue” was run.
It’s obvious that even such powerful international organizations as NATO and OSCE need to reconsider their missions, their goals and objectives to accept modern challenges.
States of post-Soviet space can hardly strengthen their sovereignty and international authority without participating in regional unions among which there are CSTO and SCO. The legalization of these organizations as influential mediators in settlement of conflicts existing in the world has taken place at last OSCE summit in Astana.
Does modern age leave possibility for unilateral ideology-driven approaches to form the foreign policy of states? The answer would be rather negative. Fates of many post-Soviet states which have staked only on one global player or center could serve as examples. They have formed an alliance GUAM accentuating on forced integration into Euro-Atlantic structures and distancing from former (Russian) “powerhouses”. That should provide them reinforcement of state sovereignty, successful formation of democratic and market institutes. Experience showed that none of these objects was achieved; furthermore a huge damage was caused to their sovereignty, political and economic independence while living standard of ordinary citizens has decreased.
Ukrainian President Victor Yushchenko who came into power after the “orange revolution” has immediately made himself known as a zealous proponent of “European values” (the sense of this expression he hasn’t still explained) and as a strong supporter of integration in NATO and EU.
As a result of splits and general weakening of the state forced by him and his supporters Ukraine was overtaken by a deep political and socio-economic crisis that moved it away more from Europe. Ukraine has been refused recently even in associated membership in EU.
Deterioration in relations with Russia during Yushchenko's presidency has crippled Ukrainian economy and policy leading to rupture of vital links. Ukranian political scientist M. Pogrebinsky noted that in the "triangle" Russia - Europe – Ukraine the last one is in unequal position towards others. “The only worthwhile resource is that we are situated on the transit direct route between Europe and Russia. Ukraine must be stable and successful country where it would be easy to transit everything we could transit, which is desirable for Europe and Russia”, the expert underlined.
That demands from Ukraine to pay more attention to fence-mending with Russia. The first confirmation of a new course is a settlement of questions on Black Sea Fleet status, gas prices and rising interest to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia Customs Union.
Acting president of Moldova Mihai Ghimpu has tried to cut the “Moldavian knot” having declared Moldavians as “Rumanians” and having pronounced for the fastest fusion with Romania within the EU and NATO.
But these ardent inspirations of the new Moldavian leader have been suddenly disavowed by Romanian President Trayan Besesku. On November 30, 2011 Trayan Besesku said in his interview with the “Romania Libera” that in 25 years the EU border will pass along the Dniester and Bessarabia will unite with Romania within the EU. "The EU border will be fixed along the Dniester and democratic development of the region will serve as a stimulus for other countries - such as Ukraine - to head for the EU," said Romanian leader. However, Besesku declared that Romania bears discomfort of Russian troops stay in Transdniestrian Region and Russian Fleet stay in Sevastopol. "If Russia is so friendly towards the Black Sea region why does she need to have such a big fleet in such a small sea?"
Besesku who doesn't recognize Moldova's sovereignty and its borders as a "product of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact" pronounced also for Moldova's joining to Romania.... without Transdniestrian Region expecting new border to be fixed as a Dniester frontage.
By these words he showed that Ghimpu, who dreams to abolish the Moldavian sovereignty, has no political weight and personality. Not by accident his block yielded to Vladimir Voronin's Communist Party who defends more successively Moldova's sovereignty and its more reasonable foreign-policy orientation including normalization of relations with Russia.
Further developments will depend on the condition if they arrange with communists for a compromise candidate for the president's chair. Results of parliamentary elections in Moldova showed, as we see that unilateral bias of this post-Soviet state in favour of Romania, the EU and NATO can lead to aggravation of the situation between Kishinev and Tiraspol and to possible division of the country's territory along the Dniester between Romania and Ukraine via referendum.
Does the EU want to have such a perspective? It's not so indisputable. "When Trayan Besesku starts discussing the EU expansion to the East or perspectives of changing state borders it's just amusing fantasies of a certain political leader. They cannot be taken seriously or with any respect as a realistic position. The EU takes tenderly to the inviolability of states' borders. There were too many conflicts and delineation, so politicians are now reasonably afraid of opening the "Pandora's box". "Everybody is afraid to do it except Trayan Besesku," said in his interview with IA REGNUM News Ukranian political expert Andrey Maximov.
There are such-like examples in the Central Asia Region.
President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov who often did an about-turn in foreign-policy "guideline" that provided a very awkward situation for many neighbours and allies within Tashkent Collective Security Treaty; he also sought for "extending the dialogue with foreign NGOs."
Tragic events in Andijan in 2005 became a result of this policy when power and stability of the state was a close call. Only emergency and cruel measures have stopped this process; against Uzbekistan the EU sanctions have been imposed which have been recently abolished.
Uzbekistan has drawn nearer Russia and returned into CSTO but pursued its “about-turn” policy incurring their allies (and not only Russian Federation’s) displeasure. The consequences of this situation for this Central Asian (in perspective) state having a large number of demographic and social problems, conflict splits within the elite and an “open account” with Islamic terrorist “international” and having internal Islamites might be only supposed.
Kyrgyzstan’s example is very representative in this respect. After the “Tulip Revolution” in 2005 a “strongman” Kurmanbek Bakiyev came into power. He maneuvered between Russia and the USA strengthening his personal power’s regime to the prejudice of necessary reforms with the purpose of receiving help. He has repeated his ancestors' mistakes and has been overthrown by provincial revolutionists where the "external traces" were found according to a large number of experts.
Ideology-driven human rights activist Rosa Otumbayeva who came into power in the thick of “a new revolution” has been linked to foreign NGO for a long time has complicated relations with their neighbours in Central Asian Region. During her governing a bloody inter-ethnic conflict in Osh has happened which became the result of post-revolutionary power redistribution. It showed the limited capacity of Kirghiz authorities and unambiguous perspectives of Kirghiz statehood under circumstances of a deep elites’ split.
Kazakhstan only pursuing consecutive policy of partnership oriented towards Russia stands a chance of neutralizing successfully many actual threats and challenges. Its partnership within many international and regional organizations supported by priority and strategic relationships with Russia allow reinforcing sovereignty and international weight of the young state.
The wisest tactics to date are to go to Europe with Russia establishing itself as an important Eurasian State. Kazakhstan realizes well actual threats and challenges and pursues the most pragmatic and realistic foreign-policy strategy.
In the end the unilateral cooperation in military sphere between legislative or executive powers representatives, heads of foreign-policy agencies of post-soviet states and the USA and NATO will lead to restriction of their power authorization. In perspective it means that they will lose their high social and political positions and their international status as well.
Consequently we can make the following conclusion: CSTO countries have to aim for more active cooperation within the framework of this organization.
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